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Building Trust and Strengthening the Rule of Law

Vetting the Security Sector in Nepal

Nepal's peace process was reinvigorated in November 2011, when parties finally agreed on the reintegration and rehabilitation of Maoist fighters and on the process to complete the writing of the constitution. Yet several commitments made in the peace agreement, the interim constitution, and in other agreements have lapsed, including commitments to pursue accountability for serious abuses committed during the conflict and assurances to establish effective civilian oversight over the army and other security officers. Abandoning some of these fundamental commitments violates international obligations Nepal is bound by and also risks compromising the peace process and undermining the rule of law.

Vetting to remove officers who were involved in serious crimes in the past from the army, the police, and other security institutions would help restore confidence among citizens in national institutions by confirming that no one is above the law. It would also improve the international standing of the armed forces and make Nepal a more credible contributor to international peacekeeping operations.

The first section of this paper discusses why Nepal should remove officers suspected of having committed human rights abuses from its security institutions. The second introduces international vetting standards and best practices. The third briefly analyzes Nepal's legal framework and how it may be adapted to establish a vetting process. Options for vetting in Nepal are offered in the fourth section.

This paper does not recommend vetting all army and police personnel, but rather establishing an ad hoc vetting mechanism for officers in senior command positions and certain other critical positions. Such a mechanism should be supplemented by strengthening both internal disciplinary procedures and external oversight. Selection and recruitment procedures should include background screenings to remove candidates who are implicated in past abuses. In addition, army, police, and other security officers should declare that they have not been involved in serious abuses in the past upon appointment. Such measures would also apply to former Maoists who have chosen to be integrated into the army or other security institutions.

Vetting is never easy and will inevitably face political, legal, and operational challenges, but it will help to move the peace process forward and consolidate the democratic rule of law in Nepal.

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1. Why Vetting Is Good for Nepal and Its Security Sector

From 1996 to 2006, Nepal experienced a brutal armed conflict between government forces and Maoist insurgents. During the first five years of the conflict, the Nepal Police were tasked with fighting the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and its armed wing, the Maoist People's Liberation Army. But the police were unable to quell the insurgency and suffered extensive casualties¹.

In 2001, the government declared a state of emergency, deploying the Royal Nepal Army (now the Nepal Army) and establishing a paramilitary force, the Armed Police Force, to mount large-scale counterinsurgency operations. Security personnel were given the power to arrest without warrant and detain without charge to counter what were described as "terrorist activities." From the time it was deployed, the army had de facto control over the police and the Armed Police Force, even though a formal, unified military command structure was not established until 2003. The military confrontation intensified significantly, and the number of deaths and abuses committed by both sides rose sharply. It is well-documented that neither side respected international humanitarian and human rights law, and thousands of civilians, including women and children, were executed, tortured, raped, disappeared, and arbitrarily arrested and detained. A government task force concluded the conflict led to at least 17,265 deaths and 1,327 disappearances².

The 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought a formal end to the armed conflict and allowed Nepal to begin building a democratic state based on the rule of law. The Interim Constitution came into force in January 2007, and in April 2008 a constituent assembly was elected and the monarchy abolished. While the peace process has experienced considerable obstacles and appeared close to collapsing a number of times, it has also seen significant progress. On November 1, 2011, the parties reached an agreement on the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist fighters and the process to complete the writing of the constitution³.

Yet a number of commitments made in the peace agreement, the interim constitution, and other agreements have not been honored. These include pledges to investigate serious abuses committed during the conflict and to establish effective civilian oversight over the army and other security actors. The army continues to promote soldiers accused of involvement in serious human rights abuses to senior ranks⁴, and continues to resist proposals for its "democratization."⁵ The issue was omitted from the November 2011 agreement, and there does not appear to be any political will to enforce change.

¹The Nepal Police record 1,485 police personnel who "attained martyrdom fearlessly fighting the terrorists." See "Tribute to Martyrs," at www.nepalpolice.gov.np/index.

²As reported by the Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction on March 29, 2011, using figures compiled by an official task force responsible for ascertaining the loss of life and property during the conflict (see report by the Nepal Monitor at http://www.nepalmonitor.com/2011/07/recording_nepal_conf.html). These figures do not distinguish between lawful and unlawful killings. Early estimates suggested that at least half of the state victims were killed unlawfully; see Amnesty International, *Nepal: A Deepening Human Rights Crisis* (New York: Amnesty International, December 19, 2002).

³The so-called Seven Point Agreement of November 1, 2011. An unofficial translation of the agreement can be found at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes7%5Cnote639.html>.

⁴Advocacy Forum and Redress, *Held to Account: Making the Law Work to Fight Impunity in Nepal* (Kathmandu and London: Advocacy Forum and Redress, December 2011), 15.

⁵The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) contains parallel commitments to integrate and rehabilitate the Maoist fighters and to democratize and downsize the Nepal Army. See *Comprehensive Peace Agreement Concluded between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)*, November, 21, 2006, paragraph 4. See also *The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063* (2007), articles 144(3)-(4), 146.

While the army largely enjoys independence from politicians, the police remain under government control. The government has the power to issue directives to the police and dismiss high-ranking officers. District-level police officers are under the authority of the chief district officer, who is a civil servant. As a result, the police lack operational autonomy in carrying out their police tasks. There is no independent oversight body that the public can complain to about police misconduct. The combination of political interference, lack of oversight, fear of the army, and implication of police in many abuses has resulted in serious failings to investigate conflict-era crimes. The police, like the army, have also promoted—rather than investigating—officers alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict⁶.

This almost complete lack of accountability for conflict-era abuses is not limited to the security sector, but is characteristic of the political establishment as well. The major political groups have acted to protect their members rather than address the issue of justice for conflict-era crimes. Successive governments headed by different political parties have authorized the withdrawal of hundreds of criminal cases after declaring them politically motivated⁷. While impunity for serious abuses and the failure to establish appropriate oversight mechanisms and rule of law standards in the security sector may serve the short-term interests of the security leadership and political elites, it does not help to build lasting peace.

The failure to establish effective vetting mechanisms represents one important dimension of this culture of impunity. Permitting abusive officers to remain in public service jeopardizes the legitimacy of the security sector and raises serious doubts about the sincerity of security impossible to distinguish between those officers who were involved in abuses and those who upheld fundamental human rights standards. It demonstrates a culture of cronyism, protecting abusive officers from being held accountable for their crimes, while their victims are ignored. This failure to address past abuse effectively sanctions poor habits, permitting repetition of abuses when officers consider them necessary and appropriate. Human rights organizations report that victims of conflict-era crimes, their relatives, and the lawyers assisting them are being threatened by the army and the police, and that impunity could remain the norm after the conflict has come to an end⁸.

Security institutions depend to a significant extent on the trust of citizens to function effectively. If abusive officials remain as the public face of security institutions, and lawbreakers are entrusted with law enforcement, citizens are unlikely to report crimes or turn to the police to resolve their conflicts and provide their security. There is a risk citizens may resort to other means of conflict resolution and take the

⁶ The judiciary also failed to stop such promotions. For instance, following the promotion of a police officer who was a suspect in a disappearance case, the Supreme Court held in 2011 that a recommendation by the National Human Rights Commission to prosecute the suspect did not represent a sufficient basis to suspend his promotion pending the outcome of the investigations. See Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch, *Nepal: Adding Insult to Injury: Continued Impunity for Wartime Abuses* (New York and Kathmandu: Human Rights Watch and Advocacy Forum, December 2011), 14–17, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal1211Upload_0.pdf.

⁷ More than 600 cases were withdrawn by just two cabinet decisions, one in October 2008 by the Maoist-led government, and the other in November 2009 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)-led government. In November 2011, the government recommended a pardon for the only person convicted of a conflict-era crime. See Advocacy Forum and Redress, *Held to Account*, 12–13.

⁸ Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch, *Adding Insult to Injury*, 22–24.

law into their own hands.

The failure to remove abusive officials also makes it more difficult to establish effective civilian oversight. Officers who were involved in, condoned or benefited from past abuses have little interest in effective accountability and oversight mechanisms.

Establishing a fair vetting process and removing officials suspected of having committed serious human rights violations would greatly enhance the domestic and international standing of the security institutions, signaling a clear break with the abusive past and a firm commitment to fundamental rights and the peace process. Removing abusive officers would strengthen the credibility of the officers who are retained and increase the trustworthiness of the institutions themselves, allowing security institutions to build more constructive relationships and be more effective in upholding their responsibilities. Vetting would also improve the reputation of the army internationally, making officers more attractive for UN peacekeeping assignments.

2. International Standards and Best Practices

Vetting in transitional contexts generally refers to a formal process of screening and preventing the recruitment of public servants responsible for past abuses, especially from the army, the police, and the judiciary⁹. In the aftermath of serious international crimes, states have a legal obligation to prevent their recurrence¹⁰. The vetting and removal of individuals who committed such abuses is one of the preventive measures that states should take.

The legal obligation to prevent recurrence does not depend on criminal prosecutions. Even when it is not possible to prosecute and convict an officer who committed serious crimes, a state still should remove him or her from public service. If an officer is formally charged in criminal, disciplinary, or vetting proceedings, he or she should be suspended from public service and, if found guilty, dismissed¹¹.

Not only officers who directly perpetrated criminal acts should be screened out but also those who instigated, assisted in, ordered, or bore responsibility as superiors for such acts. Officers should be liable for not only committing, but also for failing to prevent criminal acts, particularly when those officers occupy senior positions in a security institution.

When a vetting process is implemented, care must be taken to ensure the due process rights of those being vetted are respected. Failure to respect applicable proce-

⁹ United Nations Security Council, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2004/616 (August 3, 2004), 17.

¹⁰ Serious international crimes cover acts for which international law imposes criminal responsibility directly upon individuals and places a specific obligation on states to either extradite or prosecute (*aut dedere aut iudicare*). See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity*, Diane Orentlicher: *Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity*, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (February 8, 2005), 6.

¹¹ General Assembly Resolution 60/147, paragraphs 22 and 23. See also UN Commission on Human Rights, *Updated Principles to Combat Impunity*, 17–19.

dural standards would undermine, rather than reinforce, the rule of law. Vetting is a form of administrative justice involving the application of administrative, rather than criminal law, and includes:

- initiating proceedings within a reasonable time and, generally, in public;
- notifying parties that they are under investigation and of the case against them;
- providing the opportunity to prepare a defense, including access to relevant data;
- providing the opportunity to present arguments and evidence and to respond to opposing arguments and evidence before the vetting body;
- providing the opportunity to be represented by counsel;
- providing notification of the decision and the reasons for the decision;
- the right to appeal to a court or other independent body¹².

An exception is where officers were unlawfully appointed in violation of procedural or qualification requirements; they can be removed without any need to establish other reasons for their removal¹³.

Vetting differs from criminal proceedings also in terms of the required evidentiary standards of proof. It is not necessary in administrative proceedings to prove beyond reasonable doubt that an officer committed a crime. A vetting decision should be based on evidence that is substantiated by multiple reliable sources. A “balance of probabilities” or “preponderance of evidence” standard is generally appropriate in administrative proceedings¹⁴. According to such an evidentiary standard, an officer would be removed when the evidence indicates that it is more likely than not that he or she committed the alleged abuse. A mere suspicion or allegation is not sufficient evidence to remove an officer from office.

Vetting processes must also comply with the principle of nondiscrimination¹⁵, ensuring officers are not removed on the basis of their affiliation with a specific association or social group.

Vetting processes are challenging operations. They are politically sensitive and often meet significant resistance because they affect access to public office, income, and privileges, and they involve the management and assessment of sensitive personal information that should be protected. Vetting processes also represent enormous operational challenges. Because of the high number of individuals to be checked, often background information is not readily available or exists in a format that is difficult to access; the amount of data to be processed is substantial; or the analysis and verification of the data obtained is complex and resource-intensive. Regrettably, vetting processes regularly fail because stated objectives cannot be met within a

¹² *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 14(1); United Nations Security Council, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice*, 17; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity*, Diane Orentlicher, E/CN.4/2005/102 (February 18, 2005), 20.

¹³ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, *Updated Principles to Combat Impunity*, 16

¹⁴ The appropriate evidentiary standard is relative to the potential consequences of the proceedings. Since the consequences of vetting proceedings are less severe than those of criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Vetting: An Operational Framework* (United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2006), 26. The balance of probabilities standard is also commonly used in disciplinary proceedings.

¹⁵ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 26.

specified time.

Vetting processes can be manipulated and may lead to politically motivated purges. Any proposed approach must take into consideration political and operational constraints to avoid causing more harm. A failed vetting process may even contribute to legitimizing abusive officers by allowing them to continue to serve in a vetted institution.

This following is a sample list of institutional reforms that commonly accompany a vetting process. The list is not tailored to the specific reform needs of the various Nepali security institutions. Depending on the situation and structure of each institution, such reforms may require changes in the legal framework, operating procedures, and practices. While vetting is an important measure to build trust in the security sector and strengthen the rule of law, its impact can be enhanced if it is used with a range of other institutional reform measures, including:

- Ensuring selection and recruitment procedures are based on merit. Include background screening to remove candidates who committed abuses in the past, and promote the recruitment of women and marginalized groups¹⁶.
- Ensuring appointment and promotion procedures are based on merit. Create professional career paths, and limit the appointment powers of the executive branch of government.
- Provide effective redress for misconduct (internal disciplinary and public complaint procedures).
- Build the operational autonomy of security institutions. End government interference into operational matters and establish effective civilian oversight (constitutional, parliamentary, public, community-level, independent, and so on).
- Change symbols that are associated with abusive practices (uniforms, insignia and flags, among others). Issue apologies and other statements that clearly signal a break from an abusive past.

While relevant due process requirements should be respected in any vetting process, there is significant flexibility in the form a vetting process may take. Section 4 of this paper explores options for vetting the army, police, and other security institutions in Nepal.

3. The Nepali Legal Framework

Nepal is party to international human rights treaties that are incorporated into domestic law¹⁷. In the Interim Constitution, Nepal committed itself to not only respect-

¹⁶ While a selection and recruitment process has to respect the right to equal access to public office (*International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, article 25), there is no right to be appointed to public office, and the applicant has to establish that he or she is the most suitable for the vacant post.

¹⁷ *Treaty Act 2047* (1990), article 9; see also Advocacy Forum and Redress, *Held to Account*, 19–20.

ing and protecting human rights, but also to eliminating impunity¹⁸. A National Human Rights Commission is mandated to investigate human rights violations and recommend actions against perpetrators¹⁹. The Interim Constitution also provides for the Public Service Commission to be consulted in any permanent civil service appointments including appointments in the army and the police²⁰.

According to the Army Act, a recruitment committee presided over by a member of the Public Service Commission oversees officer-level appointments. At the recommendation of the recruitment committee, the government appoints army officers. Persons convicted of a crime or human rights violation are not eligible for army appointments²¹. The government also has the authority to dismiss army officers²². A court martial can impose sanctions for various crimes or misconduct including, among others, imprisonment, dismissal, and demotion²³.

Senior appointments within the police are made by the government, on the recommendation of an interdepartmental recruitment committee. Past conduct and satisfactory character represent criteria for appointment. The government also has the authority to promote senior police officers on the recommendation of a promotion committee. Personal quality is one of the criteria for promotion²⁴. The Police Act prohibits a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense involving immoral activity, or who was a member of an organization pursuing a destructive objective or that engaged in misconduct from being appointed to the police. Both are also grounds for dismissal²⁵.

The Nepali legal framework does not explicitly allow vetting of security personnel for past abuses. Provisions prohibiting the appointment of convicted personnel have so far been of little use since no army or police officers have yet been prosecuted for conflict-related crimes. Existing procedures, particularly the functions of the interdepartmental recruitment and promotion committees, may be built upon to set up effective vetting processes.

4. Vetting Options for Nepal

Vetting army, police, and other security personnel in Nepal would affect the interests and positions of powerful elites and is likely to meet significant resistance. While it would be ideal to vet all security personnel to identify officers who committed serious crimes in the past, it would require resources that are unlikely to be available and would also be fiercely resisted.

A more viable approach is to establish an ad hoc mechanism to vet officers in senior command positions, such as officers in critical entities (such as the Office of the Advocate General in the army, or the Secretariat of the Inspector General in the police, which must have staff with impeccable backgrounds to function effectively); and also officers in notorious units that are alleged to have been involved in serious past

¹⁸ *Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007)*, article 33 (c).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, article 132.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, article 126.

²¹ *Army Act 2063 (September 28, 2006)*, articles 12–14.

²² *Ibid.*, article 18.

²³ *Ibid.*, article 101.

²⁴ *Police Act 2012 (October 16, 1955)*, articles 9–11; *Police Rules 2049 (December 21, 1992)*, articles 10–15, 22–28.

²⁵ *Police Rules 2049 (December 21, 1992)*, article 88.

abuses. Such an ad hoc vetting mechanism could be mandated to take on specific cases against individual officers who are reported to have committed abuses. Its mandate should be limited to past abuses and cease after completing its functions, within a fixed term.

If it is not feasible to establish an ad hoc vetting mechanism for all officers in senior command positions, a mechanism to vet promotions and transfers may be considered as a useful first step.

Such mechanisms would include former Maoists who have chosen to be integrated into the army or other security institutions. The target group of a vetting process should be determined by the position in a public institution he or she holds or applies for²⁶.

The design of an ad hoc vetting mechanism could vary significantly. The Public Service Commission should participate in the process and may be mandated to administer it. A dedicated secretariat could be established to collect, manage, and analyze reports about abuses committed by army, police, and other security officials, and prepare the cases for decision. The process might include hearings before parliament or a parliamentary committee. Hearings could be public or provide opportunity for participation of civil society organizations that have relevant information. The possibility to appeal an adverse decision to a court or other independent body should be provided²⁷.

Whatever ad hoc vetting mechanism is established, it should include broad consultations with parliament and relevant civil society. Such consultations would not only help design the most appropriate mechanism but also contribute to the credibility of the vetting process itself.

In addition to establishing an ad hoc vetting mechanism, the selection and recruitment procedures for security institutions should include background screening to remove candidates who committed abuses in the past. Moreover, the oath of office that a police officer takes upon appointment should be amended with a clause in which the officer solemnly declares that he or she has not been involved in serious abuses in the past²⁸. The most common abuses should be explicitly named in the oath. An army officer may be required to fill in a written statement along the same lines. While self-certification relies on the honesty of the officer, it makes it easier to remove anyone who is found to have made a false statement.

The establishment of an ad hoc vetting mechanism should be complemented by reinforcing existing internal disciplinary mechanisms to ensure any future abuses are punished. Internal disciplinary mechanisms should be made more transparent to the public. Independent external oversight bodies should be established with a mandate to receive and investigate public complaints, as well as to monitor the functioning of

²⁶ The integration proposal the army presented to the government in early 2011 explicitly stated that former Maoist combatants who committed human rights violations would be ineligible for integration. The November 2011 Seven Point Agreement makes no reference to background checks as a condition for integration.

²⁷ More information on the design of vetting processes can be found in Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Rule-of-Law Tools* and in United Nations Development Programme, *Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: Operational Guidelines* (United Nations: New York, 2006).

²⁸ The current version of the police oath can be found in *Police Rules 2049* (December 21, 1992), annex 1.

internal disciplinary mechanisms.²⁹ Experience suggests that accountability is more effective, particularly in the aftermath of serious abuse, if security institutions are answerable “to multiple audiences through multiple mechanisms³⁰.” Other complementary institutional reform measures are listed in section 2 above.

The vetting of candidates for participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations is of particular importance. Nepali peacekeepers who are found to have been involved in past abuses while they serve in a peacekeeping operation harm not only the international standing of Nepal but also tarnish the image of the United Nations and peacekeeping. In 2009, a Nepali peacekeeper, Maj. Niranjana Basnet, was repatriated by the United Nations following revelations that he was charged with the murder of a 15-year-old girl. Incidents such as this have harmed the credibility of both Nepal and the United Nations, and they may diminish future opportunities for peacekeeping assignments. A special mechanism for vetting candidates for peacekeeping should be established if they have not yet been vetted by another mechanism.

Conclusion

Establishing a vetting process often meets significant resistance because it affects positions of power, income, and privilege. Vetting processes also pose operational and legal challenges because of the high number of individuals to be screened, the lack of background information, the complexity of data analysis, and the need to respect due process. At the same time, the risks of not removing abusive officers are also considerable. Not vetting entrenches a culture of impunity, taints the public image of security institutions, and undermines their operational effectiveness and ability to build peace and maintain the rule of law. This paper provides arguments why it is not only good for the peace process and the people of Nepal but also good for the army, police, and other security institutions to remove abusive officers.

Sources of Additional Information

United Nations documents with useful general references to vetting include:

United Nations Security Council, *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2004/616 (August 3, 2004).

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher: Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity*, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (February 8, 2005).

Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for

²⁹ *Enforcement Officials*, A/44/162 (December 15, 1989); see also Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, *European Code of Police Ethics, Recommendation 10* (September 19, 2001), article 59; and *European Code of Police Ethics, Commentary to Article 59*, 42.

³⁰ David H. Bayley, “The Contemporary Practices of Policing: A Comparative View” (paper presented to the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Police Executive Research Forum, October 6, 1997). Quoted in C. E. Stone and H. H. Ward, “Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action,” *Policing and Society* 10, no. 15 (2000).

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Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, General Assembly Res. 60/147

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development Programme has published guidance documents on vetting:

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Vetting: An Operational Framework* (United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2006).

United Nations Development Programme, *Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: Operational Guidelines* (United Nations: New York, 2006).

The International Center for Transitional Justice conducts research, has published articles and operational guidelines, and provides advice on vetting, including an edited volume with comparative case studies and analytical chapters:

Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff (eds.), *Justice as Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies* (New York: Social Science Research Council) 2007).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alexander Mayer-Rieckh is an expert in post-conflict public sector reform with a focus on integrity enhancement of personnel and structures, and with over fifteen years of work experience in countries emerging from conflict. He is a member of the AfterConflict Group and an Associate Expert with the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. From 2003 to 2008, he was the Director of the Security Sector Reform Program at the International Center for Transitional Justice. Mr. Mayer-Rieckh worked for the United Nations from 1994 to 2002 in Geneva, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Timor-Leste, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was the Chief of the UN mission's Human Rights Office. In 2003, he was the recipient of a fellowship at the Center for Civil and Human Rights, University of Notre Dame Law School, where he conducted research on vetting of public employees in transitional contexts. Mr. Mayer-Rieckh obtained his B.A. in philosophy at the Hochschule für Philosophie in Munich, his M.Div. at the Weston School of Theology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and his Masters in Law at the Universities of Vienna and Salzburg.



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